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ABSTRACT
This paper is meant to impart critical knowledge to new and upcoming spacecraft developers (universities, high
schools, research centers, young commercial companies, etc.) regarding lessons learned that they can implement to
create successful spacecraft missions. This perspective comes from NanoRacks, a “space access provider”, where
we’ve gained enormous expertise on how to design and build to requirements driven by human-rated spaceflight. As
we all know, operating in space is only half of the battle.
INTRODUCTION

and create successful missions through informed
research, proper planning, and principles to follow.

Developing
small
spacecraft
has
provided
unprecedented educational experiences for thousands of
students, from elementary school students to doctoral
candidates. The ability to design, build, launch, and
operate a spacecraft under a relatively small budget and
comparatively short timeline has enormous benefits to all
facets of aerospace. Small spacecraft have also proven to
be legitimate research platforms, providing scientists and
startup companies invaluable data, and avenues to
produce viable commercial products. The community
around small satellites has spurred an established
commercial sector dedicated to the engineering of these
modern marvels.

This paper covers a select few areas that NanoRacks has
seen as the largest obstacles for satellite developers. Each
topic is not explored in great detail, so further research
should be done based on the main points from each
section.
SATELLITE BUS & MISSION DESIGN
In Space Mission Analysis and Design, Wertz and Larson
recommend the first step of a satellite mission be
defining the mission objective.1 Understanding the scope
is the first challenge a spacecraft developer faces; since
the end goal will define the entire life of the project, it
should not be taken lightly. For new payload and satellite
developers, focus is the key to success.

Having flown over 220 satellites to low-Earth orbit
(LEO) through the International Space Station (ISS)
Program, NanoRacks has garnered valuable insight on
how to comply with manned spaceflight requirements.
These satellites fly with NanoRacks through a variety of
methods: international collaborations such as the QB-50
Program, grant awards from the NASA Launch Service
Program (LSP), technology development projects from
Department of Defense (DoD), research programs from
government/NASA centers, and an array of commercial
companies such as Planet and Spire Global.

Payload Selection
To design a successful mission, NanoRacks recommends
selecting a single science objective (possibly two) and
maintaining focus on that goal. If the payload will be
developed in-house, the remaining subsystems should be
outsourced, if possible.
The first consideration of payload design is the amount
of volume available in the spacecraft structure. If the
spacecraft is 1U in size, the payload cannot also be 1U.
The rest of the critical subsystems (avionics board(s),
power system, attitude determination and control system
(ADCS), Radio Frequency (RF) system, etc) quickly add
up and leave little room for a complicated payload.
Therefore, the size of the satellite is a great place to start
defining payload mission objectives.

NanoRacks has strived to ensure requirements are launch
vehicle agnostic for spacecraft flying to the International
Space Station. In the background, we have worked to get
the manned spaceflight community comfortable with
small satellites deploying and operating from lifesustaining infrastructure. Having the ISS as a reliable
deployment platform has allowed for tremendous growth
of the CubeSat and small satellite industry.

If a 1U CubeSat feels too cramped, obviously a 2U or 3U
size will offer more volume for the payload. However,
the increased volume most certainly increases the
spacecraft launch cost and sometimes complexity as
well. Developing a payload from scratch is no small
undertaking, and universities with small science
departments or few Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on

By helping spacecraft navigate through the extremely
complex ISS payload processing system over the last 5
years, we’ve determined the areas of major concern for
satellite developers, some of which can end a mission.
This paper outlines some of the issues we’ve identified.
We aim to provide advice on how to mitigate concerns
Martin
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staff will find this especially challenging. The payload
must fit mechanically, be integrated in the overall
electrical system of the satellite, function properly, be
able to adhere to the environment of the spacecraft’s
orbit, and be built to withstand a full range of testing.
Planning an especially extravagant payload without
dedicated expertise and resources can be a mission killer.

replacement is required, COTS parts can be re-ordered
rather than redesigning the entire system in-house.
NanoRacks cautions new developers attempting to build
an entire bus in-house. If that is the goal, then plan
accordingly. Allocate resources to dedicated teams for
the various subsystems and stay organized. It is difficult
to develop core subsystems and payloads all within a
reasonable timeline. Satellite missions have been
delayed multiple years for this very reason. Luckily,
through a deployment platform like the ISS, remanifesting is more likely than a traditional expendable
launch vehicle (ELV), for which the next available
launch may be years away. That next launch might not
even have the orbital parameters for which the spacecraft
was originally designed, and mission requirements,
including technical build and system architecture, can
vary drastically.

If the budget is small and the team inexperienced,
NanoRacks recommends that developers focus on a
smaller payload that still advances technology and has
scientific value. Establish a clear goal that is within
grasp, such as raising the technology readiness level
(TRL) of an existing sensor or procuring the payload
commercially. Plenty of valuable scientific data can be
produced without reinventing the wheel. Just building a
satellite, especially for a new developer, can still be
extraordinarily educational and potentially useful for the
scientific community.

At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we strongly
suggest new satellite developers focus on designing first
and foremost the payload, then perhaps one or two of the
less complicated subsystems that lend to the expertise of
the team (such as the mechanical structure). Otherwise,
procurement of COTS components has become very
affordable, especially when compared to the cost of the
hundreds of hours spent on developing systems in-house.
While COTS systems are still susceptible to anomalies
like all spacecraft hardware, they are generally more
reliable than in-house solutions and will meet most
mission criteria for new spacecraft teams.

Bus Design
NanoRacks classifies payload design separately from the
satellite bus design. The implementation of satellite bus
components should also go through the same review
phase as the rest of the subsystems on the spacecraft.
Satellite developers should also carefully consider
whether the bus will be developed in-house or not.
The increased usage of the small spacecraft in recent
years has generated a niche industry; satellite developers
are able to procure commercially off-the-shelf (COTS)
products from several vendors. For example, many
developers are obtaining their power systems from
commercial providers (ClydeSpace, GomSpace, ISIS,
EnduroSat, etc.). Many of these systems have extensive
flight heritage with numerous LEO missions, and are
specifically designed to integrate easily with many types
of CubeSat or small satellite buses. These providers have
teams of experienced experts and are constantly
innovating based on feedback from customer missions.
NanoRacks has worked closely with several of these
companies to ensure their systems comply with humanrated platforms. These products will often come tested
and with all the appropriate documentation if requested.

INHIBIT ARCHITECTURE
An inhibit is defined as a single power interrupt that cuts
off all power from the power system(s) on the spacecraft
to the load (the rest of the operable systems).
Most launch vehicles require a single inhibit to prevent
the spacecraft from powering on. This is largely to
address inadvertent RF transmission when integrated
onto the vehicle; the small satellite should not interfere
with any launch site RF systems, but more importantly
should not interfere with the RF systems of the primary
payload. Should the spacecraft have more hazardous
systems, such as propulsion or large pressure vessels,
more inhibits or further verification of the functionality
of the inhibit(s) may be required, but those requirements
are ultimately at the launch provider’s discretion.

In NanoRacks’ experience, using a COTS system
provides significant relief for satellite developers,
especially newer teams with less technical capability. It
allows developer teams to focus on the mission goal
related to their payload and building an operational
satellite. Generally, these systems are also more less
likely to fail than ones developed in-house. During
functional testing, the COTS systems are easier to
isolate, and should an issue arise, the providers have
troubleshooting experience and failure analysis that can
help identify root cause. In more extreme cases where
Martin

For the ISS, inhibits are one of the main requirements
that should be addressed at the beginning of the mission
design. The number of inhibits required are based on
hazard classification. NOTE: Remove or Apply Before
Flight functions do NOT qualify as inhibits. Inhibits are
to be numerated when the spacecraft is integrated with
the separation system or the dispenser.
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Marginal or No Hazards

Mechanical Implementation

A hazard is defined by the ISS safety standards as, “The
presence of a potential risk situation caused by an unsafe
act or condition.”2 Systems with marginal or no hazards
require a single inhibit, or sometimes no inhibits. This
means that should the spacecraft turn on, there will be no
issues with nearby systems. In the case of satellites
awaiting deployment, the system should probably be off
so as not to jeopardize mission success by losing power
or overworking the payload. However, if deemed a
marginal hazard or no hazard at all, the state of operation
is irrelevant.

As defined above, an inhibit is meant to be a complete
power interrupt that corresponds to a single mechanical
switch. Generally, these switches are either the roller or
the plunger types. Rollers, or auxiliary lateral inhibit
(ALI) switches, are to be implemented on the rails of the
satellite (should it be built for a canisterized dispenser).
Plunger switches which are installed on the feet. Figure
1 shows two different implementations below.

Critical Hazards
Systems with a critical hazard require two inhibits. A
critical hazard is defined as:
Any hazard which may cause a non-disabling injury,
severe occupational illness, loss of emergency
procedures, or involves major damage to one of the
following: the launch or servicing vehicle, manned base,
an on-orbit life-sustaining function, a ground facility or
any critical support facility.2
Two inhibits equates to “single fault tolerance”, meaning
that should one of the inhibits fail, the other inhibit
continues to prevent to system from activating.

Figure 1: Deployment Switch Configurations

An example of a critical hazard present on a small
satellite on the ISS would be the presence of a transmitter
that could potentially interfere with the communication
link between the ISS and the ground. Similar hazards to
human health may be associated with inadvertent
transmission as well.

Some launch providers, including NanoRacks, may
integrate multiple CubeSats into a single deployer to
maximize volume and launch capacity. This has some
considerations as to where to implement switches (we
prefer rail implemented roller switches since the
interface is better controlled), but either are acceptable
and both have pros and cons.

Catastrophic Hazards

Electrical Implementation

Systems with catastrophic hazards require three inhibits,
or dual fault tolerance. A catastrophic hazard is defined
as, “Any hazard which causes loss of on-orbit life
sustaining system function.2 Life sustaining systems
include major components of the ISS infrastructure, such
as the air filtration systems or the electrical backbone.
These hazards are to include any danger to the crew, but
also to all visiting vehicles. While some of these may
seem like daunting requirements to implement, consider
their justification. Payloads are constantly being ferried
to and from the ISS, along with life sustaining equipment
to keep up to six crew members on station alive and well.
Should some of this be compromised by a small payload,
it could result in serious consequences, and finding root
cause can be difficult in a complicated integrated system
like the ISS.

The electrical inhibit is supposed to cut off the entire load
of the satellite bus from the internal power system(s) of
the satellite. The switch can either be a FET on a board,
or should that not be an option, the current can flow
through an actual electromechanical switch. We advise
caution if following the second option as the switches
may not be rated to high currents and less reliable, but it
is possible, and we have seen teams implement this.
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Figure 2 is what we recommend for designing inhibit
architecture.
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seriously reduce the risk of a five-dollar switch ending a
million dollar program.
Besides mission success, displaying switch and inhibit
functionality during or after environmental testing may
be required. While this may seem obvious, formalizing
their operation may be needed to show proper hazard
control. If the inhibits, and therefore switches, are
controlling a major RF hazard (high power output or
sensitive frequency ranges) then a control for that hazard
is showing the system is not operating. When submitting
ISS safety verification, a Certificate of Conformance
(CoC) or Record of Assembly (ROA) concluding the
system is unpowered when integrated into the dispenser
will likely be needed.

Figure 2: Electrical Inhibit Diagram
The inhibits lie between the power system and the load
of the satellite. Any charging that could be provided by
the solar cells are also inhibited. D1 and D2 are
implemented in series on the high side of the battery. The
third inhibit, D3, is implemented on the low side of the
battery. The presence of this ‘ground leg inhibit’ is also
a requirement for payloads flying to the ISS that rely on
the electrical inhibits for hazard control. This protects
against a single internal short across the battery which
could provide direct connection to the ground.

We recommend baselining a three inhibit approach to
any system. While none of the systems onboard may be
considered hazardous, implementing dual fault tolerance
is the best method to account for any safety issues that
could arise during the flight safety approval process and
can reduce major changes late in the project lifecycle.
Many COTS electronic power system (EPS) providers
offer a “manned-rated” version of their power systems.
These should include the proper inhibit architecture as
well as proper circuit protection for the batteries (see
EPS section). If designing the EPS is not in the scope of
the mission, then we highly recommend purchasing one
of these systems.

On orbit, the spacecraft should not be charged until the
spacecraft is released from the dispenser. Internal
charging will be prevented due to the solar cells having
no light exposure until the satellite is released into LEO,
and the crew cannot charge the system externally prior
to deployment in any of the current NanoRacks systems
(this would technically be possible, however additional
flight safety considerations would need to be accounted
for).

UNIQUE SUBSYSTEMS
After determining the scope of the mission, one of the
payloads on the spacecraft may end up being classified
as a “unique” subsystem. Several types of unique
subsystems are discussed below, but any component
beyond typical subsystems (EPS, ADCS, etc.) can be
considered “unique”. Based on the mission science
objectives, these payloads can be complicated, such as a
pressure vessels or propulsion systems. The following
sections outline several unique systems that NanoRacks
has encountered.

Displaying the functionality of deployment switches is
important for two reasons: mission success and
verification. Of course, the switch must open and close
the circuit. If it doesn’t function, then the satellite will
not operate after deployment. These switches are
inexpensive, especially when compared to the other costs
of the mission, so NanoRacks recommends purchasing
multiple of the same type, and doing some simple
workmanship tests before integrating on the flight
spacecraft. Many of these switches are rated for
thousands of cycles, so don’t be too concerned about
overuse.

Pressure Vessels
A pressure vessel is defined by NASA as a hermetically
sealed system that is pressurized to 100psia or greater3.
Hermetically sealed means that its internal pressure will
not vary greatly (ignoring ideal gas law) when exposed
to a vacuum; i.e. a mechanical forcing function is needed
to cause any pressure changes. When flying a pressure
vessel, several aspects should be considered, including
design, manufacturing process, and acceptance testing.

One design complexity teams should consider to reduce
risk to the mission is building redundancy into the inhibit
system to eliminate the single-point failure point of each
switch. Specifically, we have seen teams implement 3
sets of switches in series, each set wired in parallel for a
total of 6 switches (while still maintaining 3 independent
inhibits). While this adds complexity to the design, it can
Martin

The developer should first consider if the pressure vessel
can be procured off the shelf. Because hardware is
launched as pressurized cargo to the ISS, the spacecraft
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will inevitably be traveling on United States highways
and roads, meaning the vessel must be Department of
Transportation (DOT) certified. If building the tank inhouse, DOT requirements must be met.

near astronauts. However, the opportunities for safety
approval are much higher for systems simply used for
attitude control or station keeping.
Two major areas must be considered if the satellite is
flying as pressurized cargo: traversing through the
inhabited volume of the station, and post deployment
operations in LEO.

Additionally, many systems procured off the shelf will
have had leak testing, destructive testing, and assembly
records. These processes save a lot of work for
developers with limited budgets and resources. This
paperwork will have to be produced as verification for
flight safety compliance, therefore it’s good to have on
hand. It also avoids developing unique test plans for the
pressure vessel, further reducing the mission test regime.

When traversing through the internal volume of the ISS,
the system will need to remain inhibited. The three
mechanical/electrical inhibit approach will work when
the satellite is still in the dispenser or attached to the
separation ring for any electric propulsion system. The
propellant must also be considered. Toxic substances
must have proper levels of containment and redundancy
in the seals / valves. Given the high delta-v nature of a
monopropellant system, it’s unlikely it would be
approved by the safety process for most small satellites,
but if it were, a highly toxic chemical such as hydrogen
peroxide would need multiple levels of containment, and
therefore would be very difficult to control. In the case
of a lower delta-v system, non-combustibles may be
acceptable. In our experience, even if the propellant is
not a toxic material or is properly contained, the
environmental filters on the ISS may not be able to
accommodate certain types; therefore, before selecting a
propulsion system, material compatibility should be
considered.

NanoRacks has recently seen many payload developers
looking to utilize new types of pressure vessels with
unique materials or cutting-edge manufacturing methods
(such as additive manufacturing). While these are
interesting technology developments, teams need to
ensure not to underestimate the analysis and test
requirements that will be levied to be compliant with
DOT and NASA flight safety requirements. These will
include testing such as destructive burst tests and a lot of
additional paperwork such as manufacturing records,
material certifications, etc. While not impossible, this
needs to be budgeted for in advance if looking to qualify
a system such as this for manned flight.
Propulsion
Propulsion is a sensitive topic for payloads flying to a
manned station. Propulsion can pose a legitimate threat
to the crew, life sustaining equipment, visiting vehicles,
and other critical space assets, and therefore is extremely
scrutinized. It can be difficult to get full approval of a
propulsion system, and in many cases, fundamental
changes will be levied to become more compliant with
manned spaceflight requirements. The review process
will be extensive and often requires several meetings to
explore failure scenarios and outlying cases. The
developer should be prepared to produce analyses, write
reports, have organized paperwork, and be willing to
make design changes.

As mentioned earlier, post-deployment considerations
also come into play. All items jettisoned from the ISS
must be analyzed for potential recontact. Ultimately, the
maximum delta-v of the system in a single worst-case
failure should be investigated. This analysis explores
how much delta-v can be expelled when the system fails
and stays in the “on” position. Some questions that the
safety process often asks are: Can the system expel all its
delta-v at once? What are the physical limits of the
system (power budget, software timer, thermal
conditions)? These questions will need to be answered
during safety review meetings, and in some cases,
analyses will need to be produced to verify those
answers.

The work required for a propulsion system can be
intimidating, and some developers simply do not have
the ability to support a propulsion system through the
safety approval process. That’s okay; if it’s an
experimental system with little or no flight heritage,
flying on manned spaceflight missions is probably not
the right choice anyway, and an ELV opportunity should
be explored instead. Even if it is a system with heritage,
it still may not be a good match. If the goal is to achieve
orbit or plane changes, then high delta-v systems are
probably non-starters, or systems with highly toxic
propellants (hydrazine) are likely not going to be
compliant when used on a small spacecraft that comes
Martin

It should be noted that truly redundant post-deployment
inhibits are challenging to implement for most small
satellite teams due to the strict requirements of the ISS
Program with respect to electrical requirements and
Computer Based Control Systems (CBCS) standards.
Effectively, it is near impossible to convince the ISS
Program that any inhibits are redundant on an
operational system unless they are completely isolated
and controlled by independent processors. While there is
a way to meet all post-deployment requirements and
design a high dv propulsion system capable of
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completing proximity operations with the ISS,
NanoRacks has yet to work with a small satellite team
willing to invest the time and resources required to do so.
Therefore, the small satellite systems that have flown to
ISS to date were approved based on limited capabilities
that resulted in an extremely low risk of recontact to ISS.

but these aspects do not totally mitigate the potential for
a hang fire.

Each propulsion system is looked at on a case by case
basis, so NanoRacks recommends working closely with
the mission management staff early in the development
stage. Avionics and system architecture are also critical
for compliance but are not covered in this paper.
High Power Transmitters
Experimental communications payloads are becoming
more common on small spacecraft. Generally, the bus
size offers enough room to work with capable
communications systems in LEO, and these systems are
often less expensive to build. From a safety standpoint, a
potential Radio Frequency (RF) hazard is one of the main
considerations for every spacecraft. RF hazards can be
separated into two parts: potential human health dangers
for the crew and interference with critical station assets.
Figure 3: Example Body-mounted Arrays12

Fortunately, brief calculations can determine the
potential for RF hazards; this assessment relies on the
center frequency, antenna gain, and maximum power
output of the transmitter. NanoRacks recommends
working with the mission management staff early in the
payload design phase to address these concerns.

In order to fully disprove the possibility of a hang fire,
NanoRacks recommends and often times requires a pullthrough test with our deployer and an engineering model
of the satellite. It is a simple test which can be performed
at various stages throughout the integration or testing
phases. In our experience, pull-through testing provides
great risk mitigation and can reduce scrutiny of retention
mechanisms. NanoRacks recommends redundant
systems to prevent inadvertent release; however, we
understand the potential threat to mission success by
having more than one burn wire or physical switch.
Therefore, analysis or physical tests are the best way to
show deployables are not a cause for concern.

Deployable Appendages
A deployable component is defined as anything that can
be released to extend beyond the nominal envelope of the
spacecraft. A common example of deployable
appendages are solar arrays, which can be seen in Figure
3. Deployables are perfectly acceptable to use, but some
considerations should be made.

Lasers

One of NanoRacks’ main concerns with deployables is
to show that any potential “hang fire” is not credible. A
hang fire occurs when the deployable appendage catches
on part of the dispenser and the satellite does not
completely deploy. These situations are important to
address, because a hang fire is an indeterminate system.
On an ELV, hang fires might not be as important. The
primary payload has either already deployed, or the
secondaries are integrated in a way that is relatively
independent of the primary. On a manned platform,
however, a potential collision scenario with visiting
vehicles, robotic and EVA activity, or other types of
hosted payloads and life sustaining equipment is a
catastrophic hazard and is simply unacceptable.
Dispensers are generally designed to prevent hang fires
by utilizing smoothbore walls and step-down interfaces,
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Lasers offer a wide range of uses on a small spacecraft.
In particular, NanoRacks is seeing more and more small
satellites looking to demonstrate optical communications
and other interesting capabilities like laser range finding.
If the laser is inhibited when close to crew members on
the ISS, there isn’t much cause for concern. Table 1
shows most of the information that should be provided
when flying to a manned platform.
Table 1: Example Laser Specifications
System Property
Type of laser

6

Example Response
Er doped silica fiber

32nd Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

Class of laser

Class IV

Lasing material

Er

CW or pulsed

pulsed

Wavelength

487 nanometers

Bandwidth

50 MHz to 1 GHz

Energy per pulse

.7 uJ/pulse at 50 MHz

Pulse duration

250 nanosecond at 50 MHz

Pulse rate

50 MHz to 200 MHz

Max duty cycle

50%

Avg Power output @ duty rate

10W

Beam divergence at 1/e point

12 milliradians

Emergent beam diameter

0.1 mm

Voltage of system

8.4 V

Electrical power consumed

20W

As discussed earlier, one of the first things to consider
when designing a spacecraft is determining what
subsystems will be procured commercially off the shelf
(COTS) and what will be developed in-house; this is no
different for the EPS. There are a wide variety of
commercial vendors that provide power systems for
small satellites, ranging in price, performance, and
compliance with manned spacecraft requirements. There
are numerous drivers that influence the decision of
whether to procure a COTS power system vs. develop an
in-house solution, including budget, schedule, reliability,
performance, and of course compliance with flight safety
requirements of the launch vehicle (LV). So long as there
is a system on the market that meets the technical
requirements of the satellite in design and the budget can
support the procurement of a COTS system, it is almost
certainly going to present less technical and schedule risk
to simply buy a power system than try to develop one inhouse. This is particularly true for first-time satellite
developers with less experience than more experienced
teams with heritage components on other spacecraft.
Vendor Selection for COTS Components
The small satellite vendor market has grown
dramatically in recent years, giving the consumer a wide
variety of options when shopping for subsystems such as
an EPS. As the number of providers has increased, it’s
critical to carefully consider the different COTS options.
While some subsystems may have impressive
performance characteristics, it’s important to weigh
other factors such as flight heritage when selecting a
system. One selection criteria that can’t be ignored is
compliance with flight safety requirements. There are a
wide number of power systems on the market that may
claim to be compliant with manned spaceflight
platforms. Prior to making the purchase, work with the
launch provider to ensure that is the case. NanoRacks has
spent a significant amount of effort working with
commercial EPS providers to ensure their systems
adhere to manned spaceflight design & test requirements
and can help educate teams during the selection process.

The above information can be used to classify the laser
and determine the Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance
(NOHD). This defines the hazard classification and the
associated required inhibits while in proximity of the
ISS.
Coordination to operate the laser should be done with the
DoD Laser Clearinghouse to ensure legal and safe
operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
also has applicable commercial standards. Operating
within a certain vicinity of other vehicles in orbit should
be defined and avoided when necessary. Remember,
being a good steward of space is important for achieving
long term goals.
POWER SYSTEMS
One of the most critical subsystems in any spacecraft is
the Electronic Power System (EPS), as this drives the
functionality of the payload and all other major
subsystems. While the most obvious design driver for the
power system is performance and capacity relative to the
predicted power budget, there are several other critical
factors to consider when flying to a manned platform
such as the ISS. This section will focus primarily on
design considerations, test requirements, and lessons
learned from qualifying small satellite scaled power
systems for flight to the ISS.

Cell Selection Criteria
If developing an EPS in-house, perhaps the first design
consideration is the type of cell. Nearly all small
satellites are now utilizing Lithium-ion or Lithium-ion
polymer cells due to their excellent technical
specifications such as high energy density, efficiency,
and long lifetime.6 The nominal voltage of Li-ion cells is
approximately 3.6V but the capacity of the cells can vary
depending on the size / form-factor and cell chemistry.3
Apart from the performance characteristics and capacity,
there are other critical design factors to consider when

COTS vs. Custom EPS
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selecting cells related to manned spacecraft flight safety
requirements.

extremely intensive and it was not practical for most
CubeSat teams to complete. While refining the test
requirements is still a work in progress, NanoRacks has
developed a statement of work based on the available
JSC documents and several working groups with the JSC
Battery Group that is much more reasonable for payload
developers across all levels of expertise to complete.

The first major item to consider is the cell chemistry and
toxicity of the liquid electrolyte. For example, cells with
an electrolyte toxicity hazard level (THL) 4 should not
be used in a habitable space environment per current ISS
requirements.3 Examples of such cell chemistries include
lithium-sulfur dioxide, lithium-sulfuryl chloride,
lithium-thionyl chloride, and Li-BCX. 3 Carefully review
the toxicity of the cells to ensure compliance to a manned
platform as these toxic cell chemistries are common in
other industries.

Although the test requirements are well defined, there are
still many lessons learned from previous test campaigns
that can be passed along to future small satellite teams.
First, there is a common misconception of what the intent
of the battery testing is. Often teams view these as
environmental tests, when in fact the suite of testing is
really designed as workmanship tests to verify designed
protection schemes and screen the cells / batteries for
manufacturer defects that could lead to a hazardous event
(such as electrolyte leakage or thermal runaway).3 For
example, the flight acceptance vibration test may not
necessarily serve as the battery vibration test.

For example, NanoRacks has had to require a team
utilizing a small coin cell with lithium-thionyl chloride
chemistry to swap out their cell for a less toxic
alternative. Fortunately, there are many Li-ion cell
chemistries on the market that are less hazardous
(typically THL-2) that are acceptable in space
applications for flight on manned platforms. Examples
of acceptable cell chemistries include lithium manganese
dioxide and lithium iron phosphate (among others).3

The Li-ion and Li-ion polymer cell / battery test
requirements consists of the following major tests /
procedures:7

Another factor to consider with respect to flight safety
requirements when selecting a cell type is protection
circuitry. Any cell in a power system that flies to a
manned platform requires some form of circuitry to
protect against potential strain that could cause a
hazardous event. The three major types of protection
circuitry required for Li-ion and Li-ion polymer cells
used in small satellite applications on the ISS are
outlined below:3
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Over-charge protection circuitry
Over-discharge protection circuitry
External short protection circuitry

Measurement of Physical Properties
Baseline of Electrochemical Characteristics
Charge Cycling
Over-Charge Test
Over-Discharge Test
External Short Test
Vibration Test
Vacuum Test
Thermal Runaway Propagation Test (if
required)

Cell / Battery Test Requirements

The majority of lessons learned associated with the
required testing is due to a lack of understanding of what
tests can be done at the cell vs. battery pack level, and
what testing can be done as qualification testing vs.
acceptance testing. Technically all these tests could be
conducted at the cell level if the appropriate protection
circuitry is in place. However, cell-level protection
circuitry is often non-resettable or subject to failure
beyond the first instance of operation, resulting in most
teams implementing some form of battery-pack level
protection.

NanoRacks has spent a significant amount of effort
working with the Johnson Space Center (JSC)
Propulsion and Power Division to refine the battery test
requirements for Li-ion and Li-ion polymer cells used in
small satellite applications on the ISS. When NanoRacks
began facilitating launch of small satellites to the ISS in
2013, the test requirements for Li-ion cells were

For the over-charge, over-discharge, and external short
testing, NanoRacks recommends testing the protection
circuitry that will be in place on the flight system
(whether that be at the cell or the pack level). Should the
protection circuitry that will be relied upon during flight
be at the cell level, a qualification test approach is most
appropriate (where the tested cells are certified from the

The required protection circuitry can technically be
implemented either at the cell level or at the battery pack
level. Regardless of the implementation approach, it is
critical when choosing the cell to understand the
protection circuitry that is inherent at the cell level. In
many cases, this will drive the flight certification test
protocol and protection circuitry design of the EPS, so it
cannot be overlooked.

Martin

8

32nd Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

same lot as the flight cells that are not subjected to the
protection circuitry tests).

systems that NanoRacks has processed have been below
the 80Wh threshold.

While some tests may be conducted on flight equivalent
cells from the same lot, note that lot traceability can be
difficult to verify especially when procuring cells from
an online vendor or reseller. It is recommended that cells
be procured directly from the manufacturer when
possible, otherwise a qualification test approach may not
be possible due to the fact lot traceability cannot be
verified.

Despite the fact thermal runaway propagation tests are
not always required, NanoRacks does have extensive
experience in the qualification process for Li-ion battery
packs greater than 80Wh.
The largest battery NanoRacks has supported through the
qualification process for flight to the ISS to date is
approximately 480Wh. For systems with this much
energy, there is no way to avoid having to complete
multiple destructive thermal runaway tests to show that
the battery pack is designed to effectively prohibit cellto-cell propagation. Unfortunately, there is no generic
approved thermal runaway test plan, so the exact test
protocol is still handled on a case-by-case basis with the
JSC Battery Group when qualifying systems for flight to
the ISS.

Besides the protection circuitry tests, the majority of the
testing must be conducted on the flight cells (such as the
charge cycling, vibe, and vacuum for example). This
testing can be performed at the cell or the battery level,
except for one of the electrochemical characterizations:
the 14 Day Open Circuit Voltage (OCV) test. This test
requires the OCV to be monitored incrementally
throughout a 14-day period to detect for declining
voltage in the cell.7 One of the lessons learned from
previous testing is that this test cannot be performed at
the pack level. Even if the pass-fail criterion of declining
voltage is scaled based on the quantity of cells, there is
no way to isolate a failure in any one cell in the pack.
Therefore, this test should be performed on all cells prior
to pack assembly should the remainder of the testing be
performed at the pack level.

Even though there is no approved test plan for thermal
runaway testing, there are still several design
considerations and lessons learned with respect to
designing compliant systems with manned spacecraft
requirements. For example, understanding the cell vent
path is critical when designing the battery enclosure to
ensure that if a single cell enters thermal runaway, it will
not immediately trigger adjacent cells. Depending on the
cell design, it may be necessary to add additional
structure and heat sinks around each cell to mitigate
against cell-to-cell propagation. This is critical to
consider when budgeting the total spacecraft mass and
the volume of the EPS.

As with any flight safety testing, NanoRacks
recommends the launch service provider review all test
plans prior to starting testing to avoid any unnecessary
mistakes during test that may cause delays in schedule
and increased cost.

If mass is a major design driver, it’s possible thermal
runaway mitigation may end up being a critical design
driver in the power system with respect to cell selection.
For example, 18650 cylindrical Li-ion cells have a much
more predictable vent path than Li-ion pouch cells,
which may be beneficial when designing a system that
prohibits cell-to-cell propagation.

Thermal Runaway Propagation
One of the flight safety considerations for Li-ion and Liion polymer cells is the risk of thermal runaway
propagation. Thermal runaway is defined by JSC as,
a condition whereby a cell or battery overheats and
reaches very high temperatures in very short periods
(i.e., seconds) through internal heat generation caused
by an internal short or due to an abusive condition.3

NanoRacks has additional lessons learned when
qualifying power systems above 80Wh, based
specifically on the current battery test requirements of
the ISS Program. While not all of these can be detailed
in this paper, one recommendation based on experience
when designing power systems above 80Wh is to keep
individual battery packs below the 80Wh threshold and
otherwise electrically and physically isolate these packs
within the spacecraft bus. Of course, in CubeSats and
other small satellite platforms, physically isolating
battery packs can be challenging but it may be necessary
in order to avoid extensive thermal runaway testing. Any
destructive testing with a challenging pass / fail criterion
such as cell-to-cell propagation adds cost, schedule, and

While the risk of a spontaneous internal short can never
be completely eliminated in a single cell, so long as the
toxicity of the vented gasses is below a given threshold
and the flammability of the surrounding materials is
limited, the safety hazard can be controlled. The major
concern for manned space platforms with respect to
thermal runaway is cell-to-cell propagation should a
single cell enter a runaway event. The ISS Program has
selected a total battery energy of 80Wh as a strict
threshold at which thermal runaway propagation testing
is required.3 To date, the vast majority of CubeSat power
Martin
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and CVCM of ≤ 0.1%. Note, this is not necessarily a
requirement by ISS Program and all materials being
exposed to the external environment are subjected to
review.

risk to any spacecraft qualification program and should
be avoided if possible.
Ultimately, there are many design considerations and
significant testing that go into developing and qualifying
an electronic power system that is compliant with
manned spaceflight requirements. This inevitably
introduces additional schedule and cost that must be
budgeted for when planning to develop and qualify a
spacecraft for flight to a platform such as the ISS. To
mitigate this impact, it is recommended that less
experienced developers procure a COTS EPS with flight
heritage on manned platforms. Regardless of whether the
power system is procured commercially or developed in
house, it is good practice for teams to engage early and
often with their launch service provider such as
NanoRacks to ensure that the design and test plan is
compliant with all requirements and safe for flight.

Once the satellite developer has determined an initial
components list, NanoRacks recommends referencing
the TML and CVCM data of all materials on
outgassing.nasa.gov. If the material is below the required
levels, in general it will be acceptable especially in
satellites that will not spend much time outside the ISS
prior to deployment; if the TML or CVCM values are
only slightly exceeding, contact NanoRacks for
additional evaluation. TML/CVCM levels much higher
than the requirements should be carefully considered
before use, due to the potential for rejection by the ISS
Space Environments Group.
The NASA outgassing database is extensive and should
provide developers a baseline for materials selection;
however, NanoRacks’ several years of experience have
revealed certain materials to carefully consider before
use. One of these materials is polyvinyl chloride (PVC).
PVC is sometimes used in COTS ribbon cables or
connectors, but typically has very high TML and CVCM
levels. If a developer must use PVC in a satellite
deployed from the ISS, NanoRacks advises that the PVC
components might be rejected or require additional
containment (hermetically sealed or covered with a
conformal coat or Kapton tape).

MATERIALS SELECTION & USAGE
Due to recent increases in commercial spacecraft
component providers, small satellite developers are now
able to focus on mission design by purchasing COTS
hardware. While these systems are selected for their
application to the satellite’s goals, they are sometimes
made of materials that do not respond well to the space
environment. To reduce significant re-work for materials
noncompliance, NanoRacks recommends adhering to the
guidance outlined in this section.
Outgassing and Contamination

Toxic Material Containment

One of the main materials selection concerns for most
spacecraft is outgassing, which is the release of gases and
particulates when the satellite is exposed to a vacuum
environment. These released gasses have the potential to
contact other satellites and re-condense on critical
systems. For example, an epoxy might outgas onto
another spacecraft’s optical components, potentially
obscuring valuable data.4 Since the ISS must be able to
support human life at all times, outgassing prevention is
especially important for satellites deployed by
NanoRacks.

Since the ISS is a human-occupied platform, numerous
precautions are taken to ensure the safety and well-being
of the inhabitants. These precautions include preventing
any toxic material from interacting with the astronauts.
The NASA document “Guidelines for Assessing the
Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and Test
Materials” characterizes the Toxicological Hazard
Levels (THL) associated with certain materials.8
Table 1 on page 3 of the above document describes the
hazards associated with each toxicity level. These hazard
levels correspond to the degrees of containment required
while the material is inside the ISS. For example, a THL1 material must have two separate methods of
containment. These containment levels could be
achieved by hermetically sealing the material in a
container, then surrounding the container with a payload
enclosure. Materials such as refrigerants and thruster
propellants often receive high scrutiny from the ISS
Safety Review Panel; implementing proper containment
levels typically alleviates any concerns. NanoRacks
safety engineers have collaborated with several satellite
developers to successfully design a containment system
that adheres to ISS Program requirements.

Typically, if a high-outgassing material must be used for
satellite components, a thermal vacuum bake-out test is
required prior to flight. In lieu of this test, an audit of the
materials used on the spacecraft is performed to find bad
actors, and in some cases, a formal analysis is performed
to assess contamination levels. This analysis requires a
list of all non-metallic materials utilized in the spacecraft
and the corresponding surface areas of those materials.
The baseline requirements for the materials list are based
on two outgassing properties: Total Mass Loss (TML)
and Collected Volatile Condensable Material (CVCM).
The general NASA standard is to require a TML of ≤ 1%
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Re-entry Survivability

environment, a test specimen is placed in a thermal
vacuum chamber for 24 hours. The material is heated to
125° C and allowed to condense on a collector at 25° C.9

The average small satellite in low Earth orbit has a
relatively short orbital lifetime due to its low mass
relative to projected surface area. This diminutive size
also results in the entirety of the spacecraft burning up as
it re-enters Earth’s atmosphere. However, any small
satellite with a mass greater than 5 kg is required by the
ISS Program to submit an Orbital Debris Assessment
Report (ODAR) to the ISS Program Trajectory
Operations Office (TOPO) for jettison assessment. This
assessment identifies any spacecraft components likely
to survive re-entry and implements a probabilistic model
to determine the potential for human casualty on the
ground.

ASTM E1559
While E595 measures the amount of mass that outgasses
in a vacuum environment, ASTM E1559 tests the kinetic
interactions of particles discharged from a spacecraft.10
If a material cannot be found in the NASA outgassing
database and the results of ASTM E595 are inconclusive,
ASTM E1559 must be conducted before the material can
be approved.
ENVIRONMENTAL & VIBRATION TESTING
Environmental testing is one of the major phases of
spacecraft development and can occupy a significant part
of the ground phase of the satellite’s life. The importance
of environmental testing should not be understated, as it
is a true indicator if a spacecraft is prepared for launch
and on-orbit operations. Extensive test plans should be
developed early in the mission lifecycle and revised as
the project grows. Testing should be a combination of
mission success criteria and launch provider
requirements.

While the ODAR and many of the other materials
selection criteria are levied by NASA requirements, the
FCC also analyzes spacecraft materials re-entering the
Earth’s atmosphere for domestic spacecraft requiring
FCC licenses. The FCC relies on a standardized limit for
all orbital re-entries: components returning to Earth
should impart less than 15 Joules of energy to any point
of impact on the ground. In NanoRacks’ experience,
materials with high melting points, like titanium, often
get approved through the NASA debris analysis, but
cannot gain FCC permission due to re-entry energies
greater than 15 Joules. To mitigate debris analysis
concerns, coordinate with NanoRacks early in the design
process if any high melting point materials are being
considered.

Launch Vehicle (LV) test requirements should be
considered non-negotiable. Unless there is a waiver
process outlined, write LV requirements into the test plan
and prepare to follow through. The principle “test like
you fly” should be adhered to as closely as possible;
when deviation is necessary, the testing sub-team should
substantiate the difference with technical rationale.

Off-gassing Considerations
The vacuum environment of space causes outgassing in
certain materials (as outlined above), but some materials
also off-gas in a pressurized environment. Off-gassing is
often described as “the new car smell” and is the result
of materials releasing chemicals in an enclosed area. The
ISS is especially susceptible to off-gassing, since the
released materials cannot easily be vented out of the
station. If the payload developer plans to use high offgassing materials, testing according to NASA-STD6001A might be required.

In addition to LV requirements, there are qualification
and flight acceptance tests. As discussed in the Power
Systems section of this paper, qualification means the
tests can be done on a non-flight but flight-identical
article. For example, if shock testing is a qualification
test but not flight acceptance, then the designated shock
procedure can be performed on the engineering model of
the spacecraft, if available. Flight acceptance means it
must be performed on the flight article. Usually flight
acceptance tests occur near the end of the entire test
regime, because there should be little to no configuration
changes afterward.

Spacecraft Materials Testing
If materials are not contained in a NASA database or
have the potential to violate ISS Program requirements,
additional testing is sometimes necessary. These tests
include American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) E595 and E1559.

NanoRacks has worked hard to outline requirements that
cover all potential ISS resupply missions and have made
testing as minimal as possible for payload developers.
Should a mission to a manned platform slip, then remanifesting on a similar vehicle is possible with little to
no changes (common launch requirements).

ASTM E595
ASTM E595 testing determines a material’s TML and
CVCM, so it typically is only necessary when a material
is not contained in the NASA outgassing database. To
determine how the material will react in a vacuum
Martin
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small satellite community and reading NASA GEVS
thoroughly to properly test a small spacecraft. It is
understood that many teams do not have the budget for
an engineering model, so additional margin should be
built into the design if completing a protoflight test
campaign as there is no room for error. This is not
recommended if it can be avoided.

EMI/EMC Testing
EMI/EMC testing is generally not a requirement for
flying small satellites as pressurized cargo to the ISS.
The payloads are quiescent during launch and stowage
until deployment, and the standard spacecraft 30-minute
post-deployment timer is a good catch-all for RF
interference. Should the payload need to operate
immediately after deployment, potential radiated or
conducted emissions testing can be performed; however,
this is usually determined on a case by case basis.

Random Vibration
One major requirement across all launch vehicles,
including to the ISS, is random vibration testing. It
generally consists of a 60 second vibration test in all
three axes for flight acceptance. Sine sweeps, performed
before and after test runs to identify the fundamental
modes of the spacecraft, are optional to perform, but
highly recommended as this can identify major structural
issues that may not be noticed during visual inspections.
Random vibration is generally performed as a hardmount test; when flying as internal cargo, there is the
option to “test like you fly”, which involves layering the
spacecraft in bubble wrap and foam during the vibration
test to simulate the launch environment.

Thermal Vacuum Testing
Thermal Vacuum (TVAC) testing is a critical part of the
ground segment for a spacecraft. It is the closest
representation to the environment the satellite will
operate in and pushes the satellite’s subsystems to their
limits. TVAC is not usually a mission requirement (in
special cases of materials usage it might be), but TVAC
should not be overlooked. TVAC testing is crucial to
verifying the spacecraft performs as expected, but it
should also not be scheduled at the end of the testing
regime.

This test should be worked closely with the launch
provider, but it usually provides significantly less strain
on the vehicle. Table 2 shows hard-mount and soft-stow
profiles compared to one another. Soft-stow absorbs a lot
of the energy and can be beneficial to sensitive payloads
like imagers. The third test in Table 2 is the NASA
GEVS workmanship vibration profile.11 The
workmanship vibration is meant to identify
workmanship flaws, like an un-torqued or un-staked
fastener, or issues with structure.

In NanoRacks’ experience, developers generally plan
this test last and too close to hardware delivery; TVAC
often discovers several problems that can require entire
subsystem redesign. Developers should perform TVAC
tests on subsystems individually when possible and plan
appropriate schedule for troubleshooting problems when
they inevitably surface.
At some point, it may be necessary to weigh mission
success versus hardware delivery. Re-manifesting may
not always be an option for satellite developers,
especially when manifested on a more traditional ELV;
therefore, hardware delivery deadlines should be
prioritized. Ensure the flight acceptance tests levied by
the launch provider have been completed, then perform
a basic risk assessment for delivering a potentially
“undertested” spacecraft. Most satellite developers will
say that a spacecraft could always use more testing, but
at some point, it needs to leave the laboratory. Especially
for newer teams, even if the spacecraft does not work
perfectly on-orbit, there is a tremendous amount to learn
from building a spacecraft and getting it to orbit.

Table 2: Vibration Level Comparisons

REGULATORY LICENSING
While regulatory licensing can be difficult to navigate
for small satellite developers, it is arguably one of the
most important requirements to satisfy and is a mission
killer without. What licenses does your spacecraft need?
When should the process begin? For some small
satellites, regulatory licensing can become neglected,
coming down to the wire for when it’s needed, and result
in de-manifestation of your spacecraft. This risk,

It is highly recommended to perform a workmanship test
due to its targeted nature; however, it is not a requirement
for satellites launched as ISS cargo inside of the
NanoRacks CubeSat deployer so long as other measures
are taken to verify hardware configuration post-test.
Martin
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however, can be properly mitigated through pro-activity
and proper guidance.

intercommunication and technical investigations carried
about by amateurs…without pecuniary interest”.
Deciphered, this means that an amateur operator
shouldn’t have a financial interest in the system. What
we’ve seen recently, however, is that developers seeking
amateur licenses need to be purely amateur; meaning no
government, university, or other stakeholders (including
commercial) should be invested in the project.

NOAA Licensing
Any private space-based remote sensing system (i.e.
scanning the Earth to obtain data, taking
photographs/videos, etc.) requires licensing. The
responsibility to issue these licenses has been delegated
by the Secretary of Commerce to the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). To determine
if your satellite needs a NOAA license, you should fill
out NOAA’s “initial contact form”, which consists of a
brief description of the mission objectives and
operations. The form is a simple Google doc
questionnaire that takes roughly 10 minutes to fill out
(https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/generalApplicati
on.html). After filling out this form, NOAA will either
provide a memo indicating that no license is needed, or
seek more information about your system before
providing a license. This is an important pre-requisite to
receiving an FCC license, as the FCC will usually ask for
evidence of coordination with NOAA to be submitted as
an exhibit.

As of recent, there has been plenty of confusion in the
small satellite community about how to navigate
between amateur and experimental licensing. In the past,
payload developers have utilized the International
Amateur Radio Union (IARU) to coordinate frequencies
for their spacecraft. However, the IARU seems to have
stopped coordinating amateur frequencies for those
seeking experimental licenses with the FCC, meaning
payload developers are having to coordinate frequencies
for themselves. This coordination can prove to be
daunting, as the available frequency bands for space-toearth transceiving are limited and can be quite congested.
In fact, sometimes teams are asked to produce
electromagnetic compatibility analyses to determine
what interference their system might have with other
active satellites. As processes have changed, many small
satellite developers have started to seek guidance from
consultants, or other satellite developers who have
navigated these waters in the past.

FCC Licensing
There are three FCC licensing paths that we commonly
see for domestic non-government spacecraft: Part 5
Experimental, Part 25 Commercial, or Part 97 Amateur.
With any path, it is generally recommended that
licensing is filed within 30 days of launch vehicle
selection/manifesting, and around 9 months to a year
prior to final delivery. Small satellites with unique radio
ConOps, or operation in governmental bands that will
require additional coordination efforts, should allow
more time for regulatory approval. Below are things
we’ve seen with each of the FCC licensing paths:

Commercial
Few small satellite systems have used this licensing path
in the past, however, as technology is refined and new
business plans arise, this approach has become more
common. We typically see this path as almost
exclusively used by commercial companies that seek to
generate revenue with their satellite(s).

Experimental

Special Licensing Conditions

An experimental radio service, per 47 CFR Ch. 1, is “a
service in which radio waves are employed for the
purposes of experimentation”. We see many teams use
this licensing approach, as many small satellites seek to
demonstrate technology or perform some type of
experiment. If the operational lifetime of the satellite is
less than 6 months, payload developers can pursue a
Special Temporary Authorization (STA). Developers
with a longer duration of experimentation should file for
a regular experimental license using FCC form 442.
Many of our developers seek the regular experimental
license, as they are on-orbit for at least 1-2 years.

It is important to be aware of the special conditions stated
on your FCC license. Common conditions that we’ve
noticed within FCC licenses include being proactive
about collision risk mitigation, operating on a noninterference basis, and notifying regulatory bodies when
the satellite transmissions commence and terminate.

Amateur

Manned Station Requirements

An amateur service, defined by the FCC, is “a radiocommunication service for the purpose of self-training,

One nuance that comes into play when adhering to
manned spaceflight requirements, is determining how
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your small satellite’s RF operations might interfere with
the ISS. After collecting the technical specifications of
your radio(s), the Johnson Space Center Spectrum Office
performs a radio frequency compatibility analysis to
determine if there is any interference with critical ISS or
visiting vehicle communications, and if any is found,
what operational constraints are to be placed on the
spacecraft. While many small satellites do not
experience constraints in operation, there have been
some unique cases. As an example, a recently launched
small satellite causes interference to the ISS video
communication systems used during Extra-Vehicular
Activities (EVAs). Due to the potential severity of this,
the ground station uplink is constrained during EVAs.
The best advice to avoid these types of constraints is to
be pro-active about submitting radio specifications
(preferably around L-6) early in the launch mission
phase to identify potential issues.

affordable educational opportunities for new engineers
and researchers to get hands-on-experience designing
real spaceflight missions, building real flight hardware,
and operating a real spacecraft in space. For new
spacecraft programs, this should be the goal. Define
mission success at the beginning of the project, and
continually look back to the criteria set forth as a
reminder to what the final product of the entire mission
looks like.
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